Aviation is a key industrial sector for global development. Safety is essential for its healthy growth. However its management is pervaded by simplistic methods based on risk matrices. We provide here a framework for risk management decisions in aviation safety at state level. This helps us in identifying the best portfolio that a state agency may implement to improve aviation safety in a country. We illustrate our proposal with a case study.
This could be due to the fact that aviation safety (AS) has reached a point in which safety benefits balance its costs, see [2] who consider that such point might have been reached in the late 1980s. However, an increasing deregulation and competition, as well as the expected increase in air traffic over the next decades, may put current safety levels into jeopardy.
The total elimination of aviation accidents and serious incidents is a desirable goal, but clearly unachievable. The idea of risk-free systems has evolved in recent years towards a perspective centered around safety management, aimed at supporting resource allocation processes in which a balance between "production" and "protection" is attained. In this context, [3] In this regard, it is worth noting that one of the most widespread methods for risk management in AS is based on risk matrices. A risk matrix is a tool for risk assessment and management that graphically represents the severity and likelihood of different risk factors [4] , in our case called AS occurrences. Indeed, the most important regulatory organizations, such as ICAO, EASA, FAA or Eurocontrol, support and promote their use in all aviation sub-sectors, from airports to air traffic control, going through air navigation. Frequently, discrete scales of severity and probability values are used, whereby a table with cells associated with discrete levels in both magnitudes is defined, see [5] . The risk level of cells is represented with different colors (typically, red, yellow and green, which would suggest high, medium or low risk levels, respectively) facilitating risk visualisation. As an example, Table 1 represents the matrix recommended by ICAO [3] . We might think that this almost ubiquitous presence of risk matrices makes them a de facto standard. However, this methodology is criticized in the AS community, see, e.g. [6, 7] . A complete analysis of their weaknesses is available in [8] , who considers that the use of low resolution (5x5, for example) risk matrices with non-coherent colour schemes and subjective inputs can easily lead to erroneous risk management decisions. Such limitations suggest that risk matrices should be used with caution and only when careful explanations of the involved judgements can be provided. This is worsened by the fact that, as with our state level AS management problems, one needs to compare numerous occurrences of very different nature.
[9] provide pointers to other approaches to risk and safety modelling in civil aviation including fault tree analysis, common cause analysis, event-tree analysis, bow-tie analysis and belief networks. In particular, [10] build a belief network to describe and predict causes of nine major occurrences. However none of the previous approaches properly integrate occurrence forecasting, however sophisticated their approaches are, with safety resource allocation.
In this paper, we propose a novel and systematic methodology for risk management in AS, based on the principles of decision and risk analysis. We begin by briefly introducing the proposed methodology. In Section 3, we detail its main steps: models to predict the occurrences and their severity classes; models to predict and assess occurrence consequences; risk maps to screen occurrences;
and, finally, a procedure for safety management resource allocation. Section 4
illustrates the methodology with a case study, with masked data for confidentiality reasons. We conclude with a brief discussion.
Framework

Introduction
This section provides a framework to support a state in the identification of AS risks and the resource allocation to mitigate them. Despite the high safety level in the aviation industry, occurrences 1 continue to emerge. Specifically, in our case, 88 different occurrence types will be considered, ranging from bird strike to runway excursion going through engine failure. Five occurrence classes are proposed by [3] depending on their severity: Accident (1); Serious Incident (2); Major Incident (3); Significant Incident (4); and Occurrence without safety effect (5) . Thus, we may talk, for example, about an engine failure occurrence of class 3.
Safety occurrences entail consequences. Each organization must examine those of interest to them for risk management purposes. In our case, after a brainstorming process and a literature review, see in particular [11] , the incumbent organization (Spanish Aviation Safety and Security Agency, AESA) decided to focus on the following eight consequences identified as most relevant in AS management at state level 2 :
1. Fatalities associated with the functioning of the aviation system.
2. Minor wounded persons associated with the functioning of the system.
3. Severe wounded persons.
1 ICAO defines "occurrence" to indicate an accident or an incident.
2 For non-state actors in the aviation system, these could change and focus more on consequences related to profit and loss of the involved company. Similarly, for other countries, the selected consequences could be different.
4.
Delays caused by safety occurrences.
5. Cancellations caused by safety occurrences.
6. Maintenance and repair operations produced by safety occurrences.
7. Destroyed aircrafts.
8. Image loss due to negative perception of occurrences.
All of the above consequences have natural attributes except the eighth one for which we used as proxy the number of accidents, as they are the occurrences that would tend to appear in the news.
As required by ICAO, each state must elaborate an AS plan which should lead to a resource allocation mechanism aimed at improving AS in the incumbent Given the current configuration of the aviation system, and taking into account the current AS state, a change in the resources allocated to different types of occurrences may have a global impact over such state and, therefore, possibly on the distribution of: the occurrence rates, hoping to make them smaller and, therefore, make occurrences less frequent; and/or the proportions of occurrence classes, in an attempt to make the more severe occurrences less likely; and/or the consequences, reducing the associated impacts, if these were to occur. These are evaluated with the loss associated with that AS performance and, overall, with the expected loss of the corresponding safety policy. We shall try to minimise such expected loss, see [12] .
Model
The problem we face is illustrated with the generic influence diagram in Figure 1 , where as usual, see [13] , rectangular nodes represent decisions; the hexagonal node is a value node; circle nodes represent uncertainties; and, finally, doubly circular nodes represent deterministic nodes. Here, n designates the number of operations over the incumbent planning period and k is the number of occurrences considered; λ j represents the rate of the jth occurrence; x j , is the number of j-th occurrences; p j = (p We associate with each safety policy a portfolio of countermeasures z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k ), where z j will represent the proportion of resources (inspection time, personnel, investment,. . . ) allocated to the j-th type of occurrence. To simplify the discussion we shall assume that there is a single type of resource.
Then, the rate λ j of the j-th occurrence will follow a distribution f (λ j |z) = f (λ j |z j ); and the split into the five occurrence classes p j = (p 1 j , . . . , p 5 j ) will follow a distribution f (p j |z) = f (p j |z j ). Note that the quantity z j could have influence over λ i , i = j, when the i-th and j-th occurrences are correlated, either due to a common antecesor, or because one of the occurrences typically precedes the other. However, we shall ignore such common effects here.
Once the plan z is implemented, and given the number n of operations:
• x j occurrences of the j-th type will emerge, split into (s • The g-th occurrence of type j, designated g j , results in: n gj F fatalities, with distribution f (n F |j, z j ); n 1gj H and n 2gj H minor and serious injured,
• Overall, these lead to: n F = • We would then evaluate these consequences with the loss function l(n F ,
Then, for portfolio z, the corresponding expected loss ψ(z) associated with the influence diagram in Figure 1 , would have the form
with the expectation defined with respect to the probability model in Figure 1 .
Similarly, we could evaluate the expected loss contribution of the j-th occurrence type by limiting the consequences to just such occurrence.
Risk maps for screening occurrences
A first use of the above model allows us to screen the occurrences on which to focus the greatest AS risk management efforts. To avoid the problems associated with risk matrices mentioned above, we use risk maps in which the To wit, occurrences in the area (x 1 , y 1 ) are worse than the reference, since they tend to be more frequent and costly; occurrences (x 2 , y 2 ) are better, since they tend to be less frequent and costly; and, finally, occurrences (x 3 , y 3 ) and (x 4 , y 4 )
are incomparable with respect to (x 0 , y 0 ), since the first ones are more frequent but less costly, while the second ones are less frequent but more expensive.
Then, occurrences on the "anti Pareto" frontier of the risk map would require special attention, since there are no worse occurrences in the two relevant risk management dimensions. Similarly, occurrences with higher expected losses or occurrence rates may seem worthy of attention since they are more costly and frequent, respectively.
In addition, risk maps from consecutive years are useful to identify occurrences that have worsened their risk level. For an occurrence characterized by (x t , y t ) in the t-th year map, such that x t ≤ x t+1 , y t ≤ y t+1 , it would seem to have worsened, as it tends to be more frequent and costly; if x t ≥ x t+1 , y t ≥ y t+1 , the occurrence seems to have improved since it tends to be less frequent and costly; whereas, finally, if
y t ≥ y t+1 , it would depend on how both criteria are aggregated.
Then, to screen AS occurrences on which to focus risk management, once the risk maps for years (t-1) and t are produced, respectively called map t−1 and map t , we propose to: 1) Identify the occurrences in the anti-Pareto frontier of map t ; 2) Add some of the occurrences in map t that might produce higher losses;
3) Add also some of the occurrences in map t that might be more frequent; 4)
Add those occurrences that worsened from map t−1 to map t ; 5) Finally, include also novel occurrences emerging that year.
As mentioned, risk matrices are somewhat of a standard in AS. Therefore, we require a method to transform a risk map into a risk matrix for communication purposes with other aviation agencies. Based on the map, we draw cells to separate the occurrences using cutoff points for losses and frequencies proposed by the problem owner. We later adjust the levels so that they are equidistant, according to the definition of risk matrices, achieved through simple affine transformations. Finally, we specify the colours of cells, using the standard proposed by ICAO. We illustrate this in Section 4.5.
AS resource allocation. Stochastic version
More importantly, we may provide a coherent safety resource allocation procedure based on the above elements. For simplicity, assume that only one type of resource is included, for example, based on inspection time, which is indeed the main resource available to the organization at hand. Consider that a fraction z j of inspection time is allocated to address the j-th occurrence, with z j ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , k and k j=1 z j = 1. There may be additional constraints such as:
• Minimum inspection level for each occurrence. The organisation might require the inspection of at least a fraction z min ≥ 0 to address each occurrence. This would be formulated
• Maximum inspection level for each occurrence. The organisation could also establish a maximum level z max ≥ 0 to address each occurrence.
Formally, we represent this constraint through
Then, we associate with each policy z its expected loss ψ(z) as in (1) and aim at solving
The optimal solution would be (z * 1 , . . . , z * k ), where z * j would be the inspection time fraction allocated to address the j-th occurrence, j = 1, . . . , k. In order to compute the expected loss for a given policy, we would typically use a Monte Carlo approximation to (1) at a few portfolios and approximate its surface with a regression meta-model [14] , optimising thenψ(z) subject to the above constraints.
Resource allocation. Deterministic version
The solution proposed in Section 2.4 may be expensive from a computational point of view. A more affordable approach would use a deterministic version of the risk management problem based on, for example, the expected values of the relevant random variables. To do this, given the inspection plan z, we define
, the expected rate of the j-th occurrence.
• E(X j |z, n) = nλ j z , the expected number of j-th occurrences given n operations.
• E(p ij |z) = p ij z , the expected probability of occurrence severity class i of the j-th occurrence, with
• E(s
, the expected number of j-th occurrences of severity class i given n operations.
• E(r The next step would be to solve the optimisation problem min ψ(z)
The optimal solution (z * 1 , . . . , z * k ) would indicate the fraction of inspection time z * j devoted to address the j-th occurrence, j = 1, . . . , k.
We discuss now how to model the influence of the inspection plan z in the occurrence rates. To do this, we adopt the functional form
where δ j , κ j , are constants determined by solving the system
Here, λ j designates the occurrence rate when the current resource level z j is invested and λ j * is the AS experts' estimation of the occurrence rate when the entire inspection resources are allocated to deal with the j-th occurrence, z j = 1, j = 1, . . . , k.
Implementation
We present some ideas about modelling the required elements in the nodes of the influence diagram in Figure 1 . For the implementation we have accessed numerous flight safety databases, mainly ECCAIRS 3 ; but also ASN 4 and US DoT 5 , among others.
Predicting the number of occurrences
We outline the class of models used to predict the number of occurrences of each type in a given period, typically, a year or a month. Note that AS planning is performed annually, but monitoring is monthly and some of the occurrences present a seasonal (monthly) pattern. We focus on the case in which the occurrence rate is given as number of occurrences per 100,000 operations.
We use a model in which both the number of operations and the occurrence rate evolve dynamically, as in Figure 3 . For such purpose, we combine in a novel way several standard models. Specifically, we use a Dynamic Linear Model (DLM), see [15] , to predict the number of operations (upper block); a
Poisson model to predict the number of occurrences given the rate and number 3 ECCAIRS is a software to support organizations in collecting, sharing, and analyzing their safety aviation information (http://eccairsportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ ) 4 http://aviation-safety.net/ 5 http://www.transtats.bts.gov/HomeDrillChart.asp of operations (midblock); and, finally, a DLM to predict the evolution of the occurrence rate (lower block). With this class of models, we are able to deal with the effects we have found in the evolution of rates for all occurrence types, mainly the possible presence of seasonal and trend components. The model in Figure 3 is described through
where, at month t,
• n t , is the number of operations, and depends on a state variable ϑ t .
• x t , is the number of occurrences of the relevant type, which depends on λ t and n t through a Poisson model.
• λ t , defines the occurrence rate (number of occurrences per number of operations). For technical reasons, we define λ t = exp(u t ), and u t evolves depending on a state variable θ t .
• F t , G t , H t , J t , would be matrices of a DLM, see [16] .
• v t , w t , z t , ξ t would be independent sequences of normal variables with zero mean and variance matrices V t , W t , Σ t , S t .
We provide an example in Section 4.1. To learn from data and predict with these models we apply a particle filter, see [17] . Further details of these models may be seen in [18] .
Prediction of occurrence classes
Conditional on the monthly number x t of occurrences, we must predict the corresponding numbers in occurrence classes which, as mentioned in Section 2, are five. 
Assuming that the data D t available until the beginning of the t-th period are ((s 
Prediction of consequences
We must predict also the eight consequences for the different types of occurrences and five severity classes. The kind of issues we need to address is, for example, assuming that there has been a bird strike occurrence of severity 2, forecast the number of minor injuries produced. In some cases, we shall need to make a distinction between the type of aircraft involved, for example, to predict more adequately, the number of fatalities. We use the following classification: T1, general aviation, aerial works, or business aviation, with less than 19 passengers; T2, regional flights (< 100 seats); T3, continental flights (< 200 seats); T4, intercontinental flights (> 200 seats). As an example, we sketch here the prediction of fatalities. For a full description for all relevant consequences, see [19] .
Prediction of fatalities
Our aim is to build models to predict the number of fatalities for an AS occurrence for various types. From these models, by aggregation, we would obtain the distribution of the number of fatalities associated with a suggested AS management plan, including its segmentation according to occurrence type or aircraft type. The number n F of fatalities for an accident is predicted with a model
where p F designates the proportion of fatalities; q, the aircraft occupancy degree; and M , its maximum occupancy. The first two parameters depend on the types of aircraft and occurrence. The third one just on the type of aircraft.
For the proportion p F , we consider a mixture model
where τ 1 designates the proportion of accidents with no fatalities; τ 2 , the proportion of accidents in which there are both fatalities and survivors; and, finally, To estimate the cost associated with a fatality, we use the concept of value of statistical life (VSL), for example, presented in [20] . We use the reference value in [11] for Spain, which is 1.65 Meand designate it c F . Other estimations could be used, see [21] or [22] for details.
Loss function
We now describe the loss function used to assess an AS plan. We use the concepts of measurable multi-attribute value function [23] and relative risk aversion [24] to obtain a utility function. First, we aggregate the consequences through a measurable value function as
where c F = 1.65 Me is the cost associated with the loss of a human life; [19] . The negative signs in the value function are due to the fact that we deal with costs to be minimized and value functions should be maximized, see [12] .
We then assume that the regulator has constant absolute risk aversion with respect to v, see [25] for further details. Since this one is increasing, the utility function will be strategically equivalent to
with ω < 0 designating the risk aversion coefficient, see [26] for further details.
However, we prefer to adapt to the jargon in AS, and use loss functions (negative of utility functions) which, in our case, will be l 1 (v) = exp(ωv) as well as standardise it, giving a 0 loss to the best outcome and 1 to the worst one. We, then, formulate the system
where ρ, ̺ and ω are constants to be determined; v * and v * are the worst and best values attained, respectively; v 1 is an intermediate value between the worst and best consequences; and, finally, α is a value such that the lottery giving v * with probability α and v * with probability (1 − α) leaves the AS manager indifferent with respect to obtaining v 1 with security.
Case study
We provide now an illustration of the proposed methodology. It is simplified because we consider only 24 of the total occurrences managed by the incumbent organisation and we consider only inspection resources.
Prediction of the number of occurrences
To illustrate the prediction of the number of occurrences, we consider the case of forecasting bird strikes using the model in Section 3. Table 2 shows the prior estimates of the parameters in natural units, based on expert judgement [27] , where θ 
Prediction of occurrence classes
We use expert judgement to obtain the prior parameters for a default prior for the split in occurrence classes in Section 3.2. The corresponding Dirichlet parameters were set at 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 to indicate the greater probability of occurrence of classes 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, respectively, but facilitating learning, by not adopting very high prior values. After processing the available data, the posterior parameters of the Dirichlet distribution for bird strike were Dir(1, 3, 77, 3043, 2998). As a consequence, for example, an estimate for the probability of a severity 3 bird strike would be 77/6132.
We proceeded similarly for the 23 other occurrences.
Prediction of number of deaths due to bird strike
For fitting, we used data available from the Aviation Safety Network 6 which contains information of accidents worldwide since 1919. We web scrapped this information considering only data from 1968, the year in which a substantial improvement was achieved in AS, see [1] , and included only civil aircraft accidents. In addition, we segmented the information depending on the type of aircraft involved, according to the T1-T4 classification suggested above. Table 3 : Posterior model parameters to forecast deaths due to bird strike accidents.
We proceeded analogously for the other 23 types of occurrences and the other 7 types of consequences, as described in Section 3.3.1.
Loss Function
To build the loss function, we consulted with several experts from the organisation to obtain the values for each of the variables in (5), leading to system
Here 
Risk maps and matrices
We present in Figure 5 the 2015 risk map for AS in Spain with the 24 incumbent occurrences. In parallel, we also provide the corresponding risk matrix.
The context we consider is predictive, that is, we use data until 2014 to predict the 2015 map (and matrix). To build the risk matrix we used (10, 20, 40, 60) as cutoff levels for the expected number of occurrences and (0.005, 0.01, 0.035, 0.055) for the expected loss. Table 4 shows the list of occurrences over which to concentrate AS management efforts, if we apply the screening approach proposed in Section 2.3 for year 2015. Note that a same occurrence may appear in several of the categories.
Screening occurrences
For example, ATC appears both in the Anti-Pareto frontier and because of its higher predicted frequency.
Anti-Pareto
High loss High frequency Worse Emerge ECO (13) ECO (13) ATC (15) TWS (4) TWS (4) RE (6) RE (6) LAO (12) TWS (4) CFIT ATC (15) LAO (12) LAO (12) CFIT (11) CFIT (11) ECO (13) RE (6) FE (22) FE (22) 
Resource allocation
We provide an illustration of the resource allocation process described in Section 2.5, in which we assume that we include the k = 7 occurrences in Table 4 . The assumed context is that we are finishing 2014 and must determine an inspection plan for 2015. Assume that, currently, we are inspecting the 7 occurrences equally intensely, that is z j = 1 7 , j = 1, . . . , 7. We want to study whether there is a better inspection plan. We show the required data for the seven involved occurrences.
We first indicate in Table 5 the expected proportions for each severity class and type of occurrence, under the model in Section 4.2. Note that CFIT and LAO seem more prone to leading to accidents, whereas ECO and ATC seem the least dangerous occurrences. CFIT and FE lead to bigger delays. CFIT, LAO and FE have a much higher expected probability of destruction. FE has a much higher expected probability of repair. Finally, Table 8 shows the current expected rates z j = 1 7 and the minimum achievable, when all inspection resources are dedicated to the corresponding occurrence (i.e., z j = 1), as assessed by an expert. We adjust the rates of different occurrences to the inspection level. We fit the model as described in Section 2.5. For example, for the ECO occurrence (to which we allocate z 1 ) we have This system leads to δ 1 = 0.02 and κ 1 = 7.29. Table 8 summarises the parameters for various occurrences.
We describe now how to estimate the associated consequences to the inspection plan z = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 , z 5 , z 6 , z 7 ), focusing on the ECO occurrence:
• The rate is δ 1 + exp(−κ 1 z 1 ) = λ(z 1 ). The number of expected occurrences is nλ(z 1 ), which we designate x(z 1 ). Additionally, the expected number of occurrences in the five classes is (0.07x(z 1 ), 0.04x(z 1 ), 0.11x(z 1 ), 0.4x(z 1 ), 0.38x(z 1 )) = (s 1 (z 1 ), s 2 (z 1 ), s 3 (z 1 ), s 4 (z 1 ), s 5 (z 1 )).
• The expected number of fatalities is m 1 (z 1 ) = 2.94s 1 (z 1 ).
• The expected number of minor injuries is m 2 (z 1 ) = 0.002
• The expected number of serious injuries, m 3 (z 1 ) = 0.0006 4 i=1 s i (z 1 ).
Discussion
In striking contrast with the technological sophistication achieved in the aviation system from the aeronautical engineering perspective, risk management in AS is pervaded by unsophisticated methods evolving around the concept of risk matrix see [28] and [29] , with its potential pitfalls.
We have proposed a methodology for risk management in AS based on sound principles of risk and decision analysis [30] . Its main advantages are providing an integrated coherent framework for safety resource allocation taking advantage of all available information, both from data and expert judgment. We also support risk monitoring, reporting and screening. We present two versions of the general model, stochastic and deterministic, to be implemented depending on the level of accuracy required and the available computational resources. The methodology is useful in defining the countermeasures that allow us to manage the resources referred to in [31] , minimizing the risks associated with AS, taking into account various constraints (economic, technical, logistic,. . . ) over such resources. We have illustrated the methodology with a simplified example.
On the other hand, the approach is much more technical and sophisticated than the above mentioned risk matrix based methods. We have countered this partly by training engineers in charge of implementing in practice the methodology, partly by developing RIMAS, a decision support system implementation of the proposed methodology. Beyond these, future work includes improving the occurrence forecasting methodology with the aid of SGDLMs from [32] ; monitoring the implementation of the methodology to evaluate its actual impact in AS and eventually improve it and RIMAS; and, finally, extending it to include data from Flight Data Monitoring systems to improve occurrence predictions.
Moreover, for the most worrisome occurrences we should undertake detailed studies, possibly through causal networks as in [10] .
